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PREFACE 
 When initially faced with the task of deciding upon a research topic for my senior 
thesis, I was overwhelmed with possibilities.  Writing a thesis in such a broad field with 
so few limitations allowed me to delve into what it was I was truly pursuing by majoring 
in urban studies.  My preliminary task was identifying what general subject or topic in 
urban studies interested me most.  I decided I was most intrigued by public policy and its 
effect on private development, economic stimulation, and real estate markets.  Next, I had 
to isolate a disputed issue within this superset that was either lacking clarity or missing a 
crucial viewpoint from its arena of debate.  I was able to narrow my topic to a study of 
the impact of Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones (KOIZs) in Philadelphia or an 
economic analysis of rent regulation in New York City.  I ultimately chose to study 
Keystone Opportunity Zone for four principal reasons:  
1. I was particularly interested in learning more about the evolving relationship 
between Center City and West Philadelphia, and discovering whether the 
KOIZ ultimately helped facilitate a stronger bond between the two districts. 
2. I felt that, by default, because the Cira Centre has only recently been 
completed, there exists less empirical research on the subject, leaving more 
room for original thought and analysis.  Also, by shedding light on the social 
impact of the KOIZ I would be able to add a valuable perspective to the KOIZ 
argument that had previously been unexamined.  On the other hand, both the 
social and economic implications of rent regulation had already been 
thoroughly vetted in previous research. 
 4
3. I was wary about the ease with which I would be able to gather primary data 
on a topic set in another city without visiting it with relative frequency. 
4. Finally, I was concerned that my preconceptions about rent regulation would 
compromise my objectivity while researching and writing the paper, leading 
me to a foregone conclusion. 
Taking all these factors into account, I decided that it would be more beneficial for me to 
pursue the issue of Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones in Philadelphia more 
vigorously. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the American economy has become increasingly transparent and globalized 
over the past few decades, city officials have had to innovate to attract new investment 
and prevent existing businesses from fleeing to rival markets.1  What has evolved is a 
vicious bidding competition among urban areas across the country in order to attract and 
retain investment and development.  In many cases, cities are even forced to compete 
with other urban and suburban areas within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA).  
The ultimate goal of this competition of course is to stimulate economic growth and 
prosperity within the city, as well as alleviate the spatial mismatching of low-wage 
labor.2  In order to entice businesses and developers, municipal and state governments 
have created an amalgam of lucrative economic incentives to be taken advantage of by 
prospective firms.  These incentive programs include tax abatements, tax exemptions, 
construction subsidies, tax increment financing, low interest loan programs, 
development/empowerment zones, and general obligation bonds.  
Philadelphia is no exception to the inter- and intra-regional cannibalism occurring 
throughout the country.  Pennsylvania offers developers and investors a variety of 
attractive economic incentives to lure business into its cities.  One of the more 
controversial state incentive programs is the Keystone Opportunity Zone (KOZ) 
                                                 
1 Walter H. Kirby, “City Needs Real Estate and Economic Incentives – Needed for Stimulation of New 
York, New York Construction Industry,” Real Estate Weekly, January 24, 1994, 
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3601/is_n25_v40/ai_14802646]. 
Robert C. Turner and Mark K. Cassell, “When Do States Pursue Targeted Economic Development 
Policies? The Adoption and Expansion of State Enterprise Zone Programs,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 
88, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 86-103. 
2 Spatial mismatching of low-wage labor refers to the notion that lower employment rates and earnings 
among urban minorities can partially be attributed to their limited access to suburban jobs.  As it relates to 
this topic, incentives can be used to draw to urban areas more attractive employers that would have 
otherwise located in the suburbs.  See Harry J. Holzer, “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What has the 
Evidence Shown?” Urban Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 105-122. 
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initiative, which was established in 1999.  KOZs are defined areas designated by local 
communities and approved by the state that offer reduced or no tax burden for qualifying 
residents and businesses over a predetermined period of time through 2018.  A subset of 
Keystone Opportunity Zones are Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones (KOIZs), 
which were established in the KOIZ Act 217 of 2002.  KOIZs differ from KOZs in the 
designation process: in KOIZs, the areas are designated by Executive Order from the 
governor and subsequently approved by the local communities instead of vice versa for 
KOZs.  KOIZs proposals were made to the local communities by January 1, 2003, and if 
accepted were implemented on January 1, 2004.  KOIZs are eligible to run until 
December 31, 2018. 
In order to qualify for benefits, businesses from Pennsylvania locating in a 
Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zone must either increase their full-time 
employment by 20% within the first complete year of operation, or make a 10% capital 
investment in the KOIZ property based on the gross revenues they generated in the prior 
year.3  Therefore, if an existing Pennsylvania business wishes to relocate into a KOIZ, it 
must either substantially expand its employee base, or it must make a considerable 
monetary investment into the community in which the KOIZ is situated.  The 
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development asserts the KOIZ 
designation is intended to attract development to areas where little to no activity or 
growth existed beforehand.4  The goal is for this development to not only improve the 
economic status of the designated area, but to also produce spin-off taxable activity 
                                                 
3 “Keystone Opportunity Zone: Program Guidelines and Application.” Pennsylvania Department of 
Community and Economic Development, September 2007, 3. 
4 “Business Assistance Programs,” Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, 
2006, 11. 
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outside the designated zone.  In practice, opportunity zones and other similar programs 
have been met with only marginal success in several cities across the United States.  
There exists a great deal of debate over whether these incentives are actually effective 
long-term solutions or merely temporary fixes that are in fact detrimental to the city and 
its taxpayers.   
In my research, I have examined the social and economic impact of the Keystone 
Opportunity Improvement Zone program implemented by the state of Pennsylvania in the 
city of Philadelphia.  My investigation has particular focus on the recently constructed 
Cira Centre office tower in the University City area as a representative case study.  
Through the benefit of the Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zone incentive program, 
in November 2005 the Cira Centre had the privilege of becoming the first high-rise office 
building in Philadelphia constructed outside of Center City.  Many local officials, 
businesspeople, and residents have expressed skepticism as to whether the use of the 
KOIZ to foster development indeed has a beneficial net effect on the city as a whole.  My 
research question reads as follows:  
 
With specific focus on the Cira Centre, what is the social and economic impact of 
the Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zone designation in Philadelphia?  Have 
these efforts succeeded in linking Center City with West Philadelphia and 
stimulating commercial development? 
 
It is important to approach this question from both a social and economic perspective.  
Most previous studies regarding tax incentives focus solely on direct economic 
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stimulation and correlation without accounting at all for possible spillover and intangible 
externalities related to the programs.  Certainly, positive economic stimulation and 
realization of expected tax generation are two fundamental and obvious goals of 
economic incentive programs.  However, it is often overlooked whether the participants 
in the program are able to fulfill the local and social requirements stipulated in program’s 
guidelines.  For example, the KOIZ conditions require sites to devise a plan for 
improvement of local schools.  It is necessary to examine whether the goals of the 
initiative are being fulfilled, as this speaks to the success and effectiveness of the 
program overall.  Additionally, isolated economic results do not necessarily translate into 
improvement of the welfare of the community or the city.  I hoped to determine not only 
the Cira Centre’s impact on Philadelphia as a whole, but also on the specific community 
in which it resides.  Important determining factors include economic stimulation, future 
development and real estate appreciation, and local perception. 
 After examining all of the data and statistical inputs related to the issues 
enumerated above, I have determined that the implementation of Keystone Opportunity 
Improvement Zone tax benefits to aid the construction of the Cira Centre has proven to 
have a positive social and economic impact on the city and the surrounding community, 
and acted as a catalyst for the revitalization of the Philadelphia office market.  Examining 
the Cira Centre’s KOIZ designation is especially interesting and important because it is 
located near the heart of one of the largest and most prosperous cities in the nation.  The 
purpose of this research is to help clarify to Philadelphian legislators, community leaders, 
and citizens the true effects of the Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones on overall 
welfare of the city.  This information can affect future decisions about whether or not to 
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use this incentive program to attract further development within the city.  It is also useful 
in determining possible amendments to the program that will make it more conducive to 
use within Philadelphia. 
The strengths and weakness of the KOIZ program (which is discussed Section VI. 
Conclusion) can usefully be applied to other cities’ and states’ decision-making process 
regarding economic incentives.  On a national level, this study hopefully provides some 
suggestion of how opportunity zones in general fare in larger post-industrial cities.  
Clearly, the success of the Cira Centre does not necessarily imply that opportunity zones 
are the best incentive solution for every city and every circumstance.  However, 
important conclusions can be drawn from what scenarios and situations caused the use of 
the KOIZ with the Cira Centre to prosper.  Additionally, it is important to realize 
underlying tax and policy implications that could potentially dictate the outcomes of 
zoned incentive programs.  The success of Cira Centre does show that opportunity zone 
initiatives can be extremely efficacious, the important questions addressed in this study 
relate to the set of circumstances that allowed this success to occur. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since their inception, state and municipal incentive programs have provoked a 
plethora of scholarly debate over whether they deliver the economic and social benefits 
they promise.  Cities have experienced mixed success using economic incentives, so no 
clear consensus has been reached regarding their efficacy.  While they vary from state to 
state, opportunity, enterprise, and empowerment zone programs like KOIZs extend 
federal, state, or municipal tax reductions to developers and businesses that locate in 
areas designated as experiencing economic distress or adversity.5  Tax instruments 
commonly used include property tax abatements, sales tax exemptions, and income tax 
credits, deductions, or exemptions.  The goal is to bring economic opportunity and 
sustainable community development into these troubled areas.6  Grant applicants often 
include municipalities, redevelopment authorities, non-profit economic development 
organizations (like Community Development Corporations), or other non-profits, with 
newly located businesses being the ultimate beneficiaries.  There has been a great deal of 
literature both in support of and in opposition to this particular form of incentive – the 
jury is still out as to its true impact.  Also unclear are its effects on cities of different size 
and level of economic prosperity. 
Zoned incentive program have been particularly controversial because of their 
sweeping nature.  Often, instead of granting the exemptions on a case-by-case basis, the 
exemptions are non-performance-based and given to any and every business that locates 
in the zone regardless of their background.  Other forms of tax incentives generally vary 
                                                 
5 Deirdre Oakley and Hui-Shien Tsao, “A New Way of Revitalizing Distressed Urban Communities? 
Assessing the Impact of the Federal Empowerment Zone Program,” Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 
5, November 2006, 444. 
6 Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fischer, “The Effectiveness of State Enterprise Zones,” Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, October 2002, 1. 
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from case to case, are performance-based, and often identify a very narrow and specific 
goal.  For example, Pennsylvania offers a Research and Development Tax Credit 
program that provides a 10% tax credit of a company’s increased research and 
development expenses over a base period.7  Chicago has had success with Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF), which issues bonds against the projected tax revenue derived from the 
development back into the project so that the amount of money given to the developer is 
directly tied to the successfulness of the project.8  These kinds of incentives are typically 
employed state or citywide.  Zoned incentives then, in a sense, are simply geographically 
targeted adaptations of more traditional state and local economic incentive programs.9 
There is no shortage of critics with countless arguments enumerating why the 
implementation of tax incentives can only hurt a city.  Critical literature contends that the 
initial tax revenues lost through these programs is never fully recovered, and that any 
capital generated by new businesses is not equitably reinvested.10  John Anderson and 
Robert Wassmer believe that while according to the Tiebout hypothesis11 some 
competition is efficient, competition between neighboring cities sometimes becomes so 
intense that businesses become overvalued and incentives are therefore exceedingly 
lucrative.12  They argue that firms will purposely engage intra-regional municipalities in a 
bidding war to gain an incentive package with the preconceived notion of choosing one 
                                                 
7 “Business Assistance Programs,” Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, 
2006, 14. 
8 Craig L. Johnson and Joyce Y. Man, eds., Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development: Uses, 
Structures and Impact, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 3. 
9 Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fischer, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Empowerment  
Zones,” New England Economic Review, March/April 1997, 121. 
10 John Anderson and Robert Wassmer, “Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic 
Development Incentives in a Metropolitan Area,” Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2000, 20. 
11 The Tiebout Hypothesis asserts that based on game theory it is efficient for several local jurisdictions to 
provide local public goods because competition among jurisdictions will lead to near-optimal provision of 
services and improved outcomes for citizens in every jurisdiction. 
12 Anderson and Wassmer, “Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic Development 
Incentives in a Metropolitan Area,” 14. 
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over the other no matter what.  Excess competition leads to a perilous “race to the 
bottom,” which would theoretically result in municipalities offering businesses tax-free 
residence.   
Others detractors argue that incentives only provide temporary solutions until they 
expire and the companies attracted by the incentive move to another city with new 
incentives.13  This is especially true when money is given leniently to smaller companies 
on the margin with low moving costs because they inject so little into the economy 
anyway.  Dan Dabney reports that in reality incentives are of little importance in firms’ 
location decision, and that it is more important to invest this foregone tax revenue in 
infrastructure and social improvement that will provide long-term benefits to the city.14  
In turn, these changes will attract businesses because they provide firms with the 
resources and amenities they require to be successful.  Finally, it is believed that 
opportunity zones are inequitable, at times, because they subjectively favor certain 
businesses with low fixed costs that are able to quickly move into the zone.  Along the 
same lines, proprietors in adjacent neighborhoods in the same city are subject to 
potentially artificially induced competition.15  
Defenders of opportunity zones assert that incentives are necessary in certain 
areas that have high property taxation and inadequate business services, which is a 
chronic deterrent to investment.16  Supporters argue this shortage of new investment 
results in higher levels of taxes paid by the poor because of lack of mobility, and a lower 
                                                 
13 Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fischer, “Tax and Spending Incentives and Empowerment Zones,” 114. 
14 Dan Y. Dabney, “Do Enterprise Zone Incentives Affect Business Location Decisions?” Economic 
Development Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1991, 332. 
15 Natalie Kostelni, “Cira Centre 75% Leased Up: Lubert Adler, others lured by tax breaks,” Philadelphia 
Business Journal, April 8, 2005, 
[http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2005/04/11/story1.html?page=2]. 
16 Gwenelle S. O’Neal and Ronald A. O’Neal, “Community Development in the USA: An Empowerment 
Zone Example,” Community Development Journal, Vol. 3 No. 32, April 2003, 126. 
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level of local public services and employment opportunities.  Thus, while municipalities 
would like to invest in infrastructure, they are unable to do so without significant revenue 
from a growing business sector.  Additionally, incentives correct the market failure of 
mispricing of value of additional jobs in a city with high unemployment where each extra 
job is worth a great deal.  In other words, cities with high unemployment are inherently 
more like to have underused public infrastructure, so each additional job is more valuable 
on the margin.17  As it relates to tax zones, according to Terry Buss if zone policies 
correct market failures that inhibit efficient use of resources they can increase overall 
economic efficiency.18   
Robert Guskind, a renowned urban planning expert, believes opportunity zones 
within cities can also help prevent sprawl, which moves tax revenue away from cities in 
need into wealthier suburban areas.19  In this sense, the government is providing a check 
on an industry saturated by private firms that do not necessarily account for the social 
benefits and costs of their actions.  Zoned incentives can particularly help local distressed 
areas be more competitive for new business locations than they otherwise would be in 
regards to the nature of the tax distribution system in any given state.20  The idea behind 
these zones incentives is that as the cost of transportation and communication decreases, 
so does the value of the implicit urban benefit of agglomeration.  Thus, as firms become 
more footloose, they become increasingly responsive to local costs like wages and taxes – 
which can be mitigated by incentives.21  Guskind further argues that even if some 
                                                 
17 Anderson and Wassmer, “Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic Development 
Incentives in a Metropolitan Area,” 9. 
18 Terry F. Buss, “The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: 
An Overview of the Literature,” Economic Development Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2001, 93. 
19 Robert Guskind, “Games Cities Play,” National Journal, March 18, 1989, 636. 
20 Timothy Bartik, “Incentive Solutions,” Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, February 2004, 16. 
21 Bartik, “Incentive Solutions,” 4. 
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incentives are inefficient, they are firmly embedded in today’s public policy throughout 
the nation, and firms expected them.  He explains that stonewalling businesses altogether 
usually results in economic stagnation.22  The result, according to Timothy Bartik, is that 
without some kind of national agreement banning incentives, communities will continue 
to offer them with modest effect of business decisions, no added competitive advantage, 
and a net loss for government nationwide.23   
As noted in the introduction, the most prominent recent development in 
Philadelphia taking advantage of Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity Improvement 
Zone incentive program is the Cira Centre on 29th and Arch Streets, adjacent to the 30th 
Street Station, the city’s central regional train and mass transit hub.  Developed by 
Brandywine Realty Trust, the Cira Centre was completed in November 2005, and is the 
first commercial office development in Philadelphia to have participated in 
Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity Investment Zone initiative.   Benefits of the KOIZ 
package received by Brandywine Realty Trust include abatements from corporate net 
income tax, personal income tax, capital stock/foreign franchise tax, insurance gross 
premiums tax, bank shares tax, mutual thrift institutions tax, sales & use tax, business 
privilege tax, net profits tax, real property tax, and use & occupancy tax.  Of abatements 
listed, the business privilege tax, net profits tax, real estate tax, sales & use tax, and use & 
occupancy tax are abatements from municipal taxes of the city of Philadelphia (the real 
estate property tax abatement is universally abated throughout the city for new 
development or improvement of residential and commercial properties).  All of these 
abatements will continue in full through December 31, 2018.   
                                                 
22 Guskind, 635. 
23 Timothy Bartik, “Local Economic Development Policies,” Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 
January 2003, 18. 
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Another current development, the Comcast Center on 17th and JFK Boulevard, 
was denied KOIZ status by the state after it was determined that the property did not meet 
the program’s criteria.  Unlike the Cira Centre, since the project is already located in 
Center City, the state felt a KOIZ was an inappropriate designation and unnecessary to 
attract businesses to the site.  Instead, the Comcast Center was given nearly $30 million 
in infrastructure and construction-related subsidies.  The Comcast Center is due for 
completion in early 2008, and is currently 96% pre-leased.24  
Though state governments naturally defend the validity of their own programs, 
incentive zones countrywide often have been criticized for draining municipal funds 
without providing any economic stimulation or new job creation.25  Alan Peters and Peter 
Fisher estimate that among the 75 enterprise zones they sampled in 2002, the effective 
tax rate on new construction decreased by 33%.26  However, the extra incentive firms 
receive from the opportunity zone benefits is relatively small in terms of wage equivalent, 
so job creation is actually minimal. Additionally, these jobs are often filled by more 
affluent individuals from outside the zone.27  Timothy Bartik notes that numerous studies 
have been done that conclude that business activity growth in zip codes with state-
designated enterprise zones is only minimally higher than growth in zip codes without 
enterprise zones.28  Wassmer and Anderson contend that competition is so fierce within 
each MSA that inner cities are forced to effectively engage in an arms race in order to 
                                                 
24 Fernandez, Bob, “Office Space in City Rebounds: The new Comcast building spurred fears of a glut,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 19, 2007, [http://www.philly.com/philly/business/8064912.html]. 
25 Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fischer, “The Effectiveness of State Enterprise Zones,” 3. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Ibid., 2-3. 
28 Bartik, “Local Economic Development Policies,” 37. 
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lure companies away from fringe cities and suburbs.29  This results in increasingly 
attractive offers to businesses with no regard for the negative effect on tax collection and 
provision for local infrastructure and education. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Keystone Opportunity Zone program in 
Pennsylvania has received some unfriendly reviews from local economist and critics.  
The vast majority of literature regarding the Cira Centre development leading up to its 
construction was negative.  One of the most vocal opponents was Kevin Gillen30, a 
Wharton real estate professor and Vice President of the Econsult Corporation economic 
consulting firm.  He estimated that the development could cost the city $44 million a year 
in tax revenue, much of which would “fall disproportionately on the Philadelphia School 
District, which is forecast to lose at least $20 million per year regardless of how many 
existing office tenants the city manages to retain.”31  He believes that the city is 
anticipating an unreasonable amount of stimulation and revenue from the building, and 
that for the deal to be lucrative the Cira Centre would have to perform almost impossibly 
well.   
Similarly, in January 2004, the Philadelphia Center City District expected the city 
to lose between $14 and $24 million in tax revenue in 2007, and up to $66 million by 
2009 depending on the rate of business growth in Center City.32  Both parties were 
concerned that Brandywine would simply fill the Cira Centre with tenants from existing 
                                                 
29 Anderson and Wassmer, “Bidding for Business: The Efficacy of Local Economic Development 
Incentives in a Metropolitan Area,” 13. 
30 Kevin Gillen’s studies regarding KOZs and KOIZs in Philadelphia (see bibliography) were 
commissioned independently of the Wharton School and Econsult Corporation and do not reflect the views 
of either organization.  
31 Kevin Gillen, “The Potential Fiscal Consequences of KOIZs on the Downtown Philadelphia Office 
Market,” April 14, 2004, 2. 
32 “The Impact of Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones in or Adjacent to Center City,” Philadelphia 
Center City District, January 14, 2004, 1. 
 17
Central Business District buildings that are in search of a tax break.  This in turn would 
decrease property values in Center City and increase vacancy rates citywide without 
creating any new jobs.  Center City landlords complained vehemently that they were 
being stripped of tenants based on a subjective program that not only unfairly favors 
some developers and landowners over others, but also divests the city of money that it 
could be using to improve infrastructure.33 
However, there has been very little antagonistic literature about the Cira Centre in 
the two years since its completion.  In fact, several works have been cautiously optimistic 
about the future returns of the Cira Centre.34  In a report commissioned by Brandywine, 
Econsult35 estimates the Cira Centre has the potential to generate an extra $11.9 million 
of local tax revenue annually between 2006 and 2018.36  Furthermore, Econsult estimates 
that, through the Cira Centre, the KOIZ will produce an extra $90 million in local tax 
revenue for the city of Philadelphia over the next 30 years compared with if the city had 
not implemented the initiative.37  Defense of incentive programs like the Keystone 
Opportunity Improvement Zones normally stems from their alleged ability to create jobs.  
According to the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, 
the KOZs in Pennsylvania have created more than 63,900 new jobs and retained more 
than 48,100 jobs in the zones since the first KOZ program began in 1999.  Could it be 
that the Cira Centre has started a new trend of success among opportunity zones?  
                                                 
33 Natalie Kostelni, “Cira Centre 75% Leased Up: Lubert Adler, others lured by tax breaks.” 
34 “Estimated Economic and Fiscal Impact of the Cira Centre,” Econsult Corporation, January 2007. 
35 According to its website (www.econsult.com), Econsult Corporation is private corporation hired to 
provides economic research and analysis in support of litigation, as well as economic consulting services 
for businesses and public policy decision-makers.  Econsult has extensive consulting experience in 
transportation economics, economic impact analysis and project valuation, economic and real estate 
development, and state and local policy and finance.  Econsult is in no way affiliated with the Brandywine 
Realty Trust, and claims full objectivity in its assessment of the Cira Centre. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
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As the first commercial office development in Philadelphia to take advantage of 
the KOIZ, the Cira Centre provides valuable insight into the future efficacy of the 
program in Philadelphia.  A pioneering entity of sorts, the success or failure of the Cira 
Centre should be indicative of a commercial push further west.  Most previous literature 
has written-off tax zone incentives as futile or minimally effective, at best.  The KOIZ 
program is somewhat different from the enterprise zones and empowerment zones 
previously studied because it is more reliant on local decision-making and project-
specific decision.  If the KOIZ and Cira Centre prove successful in Philadelphia, it would 
be useful to determine whether there are distinctive circumstances that caused it to 
succeed while most tax zones have failed nationally.   
Opportunity zones generally are located in small developing or dying cities, as 
opposed to large, mature cities like Philadelphia.38  Philadelphia is the fifth largest city in 
the United States, and the ninth richest city in the world in term of Gross Domestic 
Product – many would argue that tax incentives are unnecessary.39  My research focuses 
on the Cira Centre to examine how opportunity zones perform in larger markets.  
Previous research has evaluated KOZs in other areas around Pennsylvania, but only 
speculative literature has been produced about the effectiveness of KOIZs in the city of 
Philadelphia.  My research is intended to determine whether it is necessary for cities with 
the size and appeal of Philadelphia to offer significant economic incentives to attract 
businesses.  
In addition to economic and statistical evaluation, my research provides a 
qualitative social evaluation of opportunity zones absent from the current collection of 
                                                 
38 Fritz W. Wagner, Timothy E. Joder, Anthony J. Mumphrey Jr., eds., Urban Revitalization: Policy and 
Programs, (USA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1995), 94. 
39 “Largest Cities,” City Mayors, [http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/richest-cities-gdp-intro.html]. 
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work on the subject.  For example, the Powelton Village neighborhood directly west of 
the Cira Centre has historically struggled economically.  Brandywine and the Cira 
Centre’s contribution to the local economy and civic environment is an important part of 
evaluating the success of the KOIZ and the Cira Centre project.  According to Alen 
Amirkhanian “economic stimulation does not mean displacement of former residents and 
businesses, but rather improvement of current conditions through attraction of new 
investment.”40  The KOIZ designation should serve the dual purpose of fostering growth 
of existing businesses in the area and attracting new business and development to the 
area.  Therefore, the situation opportunity zones create for the local residents and 
businesses of the area is an essential factor to consider, and could provide new insight 
into the debate over economic incentives.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Alen Amirkhanian, “This Works: Encouraging Economic Growth,” The Manhattan Institute Civic 
Bulletin, No. 33 March 2003. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to determine the effects of the Cira Centre’s KOIZ designation on the 
Philadelphia community and economy, I needed to create a comprehensive model that 
would account for numerous externalities created by the building.  In order to complete 
this model, I compiled and evaluated the following factors that I feel best disclose the 
Cira Centre’s net impact on Philadelphia in relation to the goals of the Keystone 
Opportunity Zone legislation:  
• Satisfaction of the stated goals of the KOIZ program (enumerated in Section 
V. Data/Discussion & Analysis) 
• Economic activity and stimulation 
o Capital flowing into the economy 
o Employment creation by sector and geography 
o Net municipal revenue gain/loss 
• Effect on the local real estate market and local economic impact 
o Residential real estate prices 
o Commercial development 
o Facilitation of new or enhanced connection between Center City and 
West Philadelphia 
• Effect on the Center City office market 
o Vacancy and absorption rates 
o Recent development 
• Intangible factors 
o Aesthetic externalities 
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o Effect on external perceptions of the city 
o Catalytic influence on other landlords and developers in Philadelphia 
 
A. SECONDARY SOURCES 
I used several sources and research methods to accrue data.  Secondary data 
included state and municipal incentive guides, stimulation and investment plans, business 
surveys, municipal statistics, district reports; and privately published real estate reports, 
economic surveys, and related research studies.  The incentive guides and stimulation 
plans provided me with information regarding the specific terms and principles of the 
Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones, as well as growth and success of KOIZs and 
related programs. The use of official statistics from the agencies like the Philadelphia 
Records Department, the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development provided me with 
the quantitative basis of my research data.  Relevant reports and papers published 
annually by the Philadelphia municipal government and its affiliates, including the Area 
Redevelopment Publications, Center City District Studies, Real Estate Surveys, and 
Housing and Vacancy Reports helped show how KOIZs affect occupancy, economic 
stimulation, and demographics in targeted regions and neighborhoods within the city. 
Reports produced by private entities provided data more specifically related to 
Keystone Opportunity Zones in Philadelphia.  For example, the Philadelphia Center City 
District offers methods of quantifying the effect of KOIZs on the Philadelphia economy 
like sorting the taxpayer data by location and form of business, calculating square foot 
averages by industry and company type, then finding the municipal tax revenue that is 
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gained or lost by new jobs created or jobs displaced.41  Report cards and economic 
evaluations done by districts and local economists show specific project impacts and 
relevant spin-off effects.  Articles from local news sources like the Philadelphia Inquirer 
and the Philadelphia Business Journal allow me to understand the different perspectives 
on the project over the life of its existence. Because the Cira Centre issue is so recent, 
these sources were important for gaining basic information and related statistics about 
KOIZs and the newer Cira Centre projects.  Information and reports from real estate 
brokers like Cushman & Wakefield, CB Richard Ellis, and Grubb & Ellis provide current 
updates of the real estate market in Philadelphia, and shows flows and trends of housing 
prices, leasing trends, and real estate fundamentals.  Finally, some historical sources 
provide a theoretical framework with which to analyze the data supplied by the 
aforementioned reports. 
 
B. PRIMARY SOURCES 
In addition to gathering secondary data, I have interviewed a handful of 
economists, industry experts, and local leaders with knowledge of the subject.  I also 
surveyed the property to examine its physical nature in relation to the community and its 
adherence to urban tenets. 
INTERVIEWS 
1. Richard Voith: Dr. Voith is a Real Estate professor at the Wharton School of 
Business, the Senior Vice President and Principal of Econsult Corporation, and was the 
leader of the Greater Philadelphia Transportation Initiative.  Dr. Voith is expert in 
transportation and urban economics, and was appointed by Governor Ed Rendell to the 
                                                 
41 “The Impact of Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones in or Adjacent to Center City,” 3. 
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Transportation Funding and Reform Commission. As mentioned earlier, the Econsult 
Corporation was commissioned by Brandywine Realty Trust to perform an economic 
feasibility analysis report to consider the potential success of the building in terms of .  
Dr. Voith is highly familiar with the Cira Centre and its relationship with the KOIZ 
initiative.   
2. John Gattuso: Mr. Gattuso is the Senior Vice President and Director of 
National & Urban Development of Liberty Property Trust.  Liberty Property Trust is the 
developer of the new Comcast Center in Center City, which was also under consideration 
for KOIZ status during its initial stages, but was denied designation by the state of 
Pennsylvania.  Mr. Gattuso has a keen knowledge of the Greater Philadelphia office 
market, as well as an acute understanding of KOIZ legislation and its effects.   
3. Craig Zolot: Mr. Zolot is a Principal and Director of Asset Management of 
Rubenstein Partners, a private equity real estate investment firm that relocated into the 
Cira Centre upon its completion in 2005.  Mr. Zolot was able to provide me with a 
tenant’s perspective on his company’s relocation decision and the factors that were 
considered, as well as their intentions for the future.  In addition, as a principal of a firm 
that invests in office properties in the Mid-Atlantic, Mr. Zolot has intimate knowledge of 
the local office market and spoke about the effect of the Cira Centre on the Philadelphia 
market. 
4. Tony Dominick: Mr. Dominick is the President of the Powelton Village Civic 
Association, and a prominent Powelton Village leader.  Mr. Dominick discussed with me 
the relationship between Brandywine, the Cira Centre, and the local community.  This 
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interview gave me valuable insight as to the social and local impact the Cira Centre has 
had on University City and, more specifically, the Powelton Village community. 
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V. DATA/DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. KEYSTONE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PARAMETERS 
According to the Pennsylvania Department of Economic and Community Development, 
to qualify for Keystone Opportunity Zone designation a targeted project and zone must 
possess the following qualities:42 
1. A plan to target growth. 
2. Area must display adverse economic or socioeconomic conditions. 
3. Linkages to regional community and economic development activities. 
4. A written plan discussing the implementation of quality school 
improvements and local crime reduction measures. 
5. A demonstrated cooperation from surrounding municipalities. 
These parameters indicate a necessity to stimulate economic growth, improve local 
infrastructure, and promote social value.  In addition to these general parameters, 
businesses moving into the zone must abide by the following restrictions:43 
1. Business: A business must own or lease real property in a KOZ and 
actively conduct a trade, profession or business from the property and 
remain compliant with state and local tax laws and building codes. 
Existing businesses that are expanding, new businesses and out-of-state 
businesses moving into Pennsylvania need only move into a KOZ, file a 
one page annual application for benefits and submit the application with a 
                                                 
42 Pennsylvania Department of Community & Economic Development, “What is a Keystone Opportunity 
Zone?” [http://www.newpa.com/default.aspx?id=346].  
43 “Keystone Opportunity Zone Program Guidelines and Application,” 1. 
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synopsis of the business, which contains a description of the business, job 
creation potential and the anticipated capital investment.  
2. Relocation: An existing Pennsylvania business relocating into a KOZ 
must meet one of the following relocation provisions: 
a. Increase full-time employment by at least 20% in the first full year 
of operation within the KOZ or; 
b. Make a capital investment in the property located within the KOZ 
equivalent to 10% of the gross revenues of that business in the 
immediately proceeding calendar or fiscal year attributable to the 
business location or locations that are being relocated to a subzone. 
c. Enter into a lease agreement for property located within the 
subzone, improvement subzone or expansion subzone for a term at 
least equivalent to the duration of the subzone and with the 
aggregate payment under the lease agreement at least equivalent to 
5% of the gross revenues of that business in the immediately 
preceding calendar or fiscal year. 
These restrictions ensure that firms moving into the zones are productive, contribute 
directly to the local economy, and intend to remain in the zone for a significant period of 
time.  These provisions also reduce the probability of the city getting taken advantage of 
by a company on the margin. 
B. ECONOMIC STIMULATION AND ACTIVITY 
 Little data has been released to exhibit the direct economic growth and tax 
revenue generated by the Cira Centre because it was only completed two years ago, but 
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there have been several forecasts projected its estimated effects on Philadelphia.  
Research shows that the Cira Centre will provide the City of Philadelphia with long-term 
returns that exceed projected revenue streams previous to its construction, even in worst-
case scenario forecasts.  In a study generated by the Center City District meant to oppose 
the Cira Centre’s construction, even if the building were fully occupied only by top-tier 
firms vacating class A Center City office buildings, and the city experienced a paltry 
absorption rate of the vacated space at 116,000 square feet per year, the city still begins 
realizing positive annual tax returns in 2012, and a cumulative revenue infusion of nearly $23 
million by 2018 (See Table 1 in Appendix A).44  Of course in reality only about 60% of the 
Cira Centre is occupied by firms from Center City (See Table 2 in Appendix A) , and 
absorption rates since 2004 have been well over 500,000 square feet annually.   
Econsult completed the most recent and realistic projection of the Cira Centre’s fiscal 
and economic impact in January, 2007.  Conservative, yet more realistic projections from 
Econsult reveal that as a result of the Cira Centre’s construction, when compared with a “no 
KOIZ” scenario, Philadelphia experiences positive net gains each year from completion and 
nearly $50 million in cumulative income by 2018 (see Cumulative Gain (Loss) from KOIZ 
below), at which point gains increase considerably.45  Based on the estimated job growth 
created by the Cira Centre, Philadelphia gained $2 million in upfront revenue from 
construction, and will gross $12 million annually from 2006 to 2018, and $18 million 
annually thereafter once the tax abatements have expired (See Table 3 in Appendix A).46 
The cumulative estimated present value of Philadelphia’s cash flow from the KOIZ 
                                                 
44 “The Impact of Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zones in or Adjacent to Center City,” 6. 
45 “Estimated Economic and Fiscal Impact of the Cira Centre,” 6. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
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versus non-KOIZ in the area between 2006 and 2036 is $239.4 million to $145.6.47  
While this reflects more than just the Cira Centre’s impact on the city, it speaks to the 
overall success full of the tax zone programs in the city. 
Cumulative Gain (Loss) from KOIZ 
 
Source: Econsult Corporation. 
 In terms of economic output and impact on the Philadelphia economy, the 
projections are significant.  Timothy Bartik asserts that social benefits of economic 
stimulation from incentives are considerably diminished if the jobs created are low-wage, 
or if few local workers are hired.48  Through the phases of construction, lease-up, and 
operations, the Cira Centre has created 2,188 jobs; 1,273 of them from Philadelphia and 
945 of them new to city.49  31% of the jobs created are permanent professional, scientific, 
and technical service jobs.  Based on the amount of new jobs created by the project, 
Econsult approximates the annual new output derived from the Cira Centre is over $93 
million, supporting over 1,600 new jobs creating over $80 million in earnings within 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 37. 
48 Bartik, “Incentive Solutions,” 10. 
49 “Estimated Economic and Fiscal Impact of the Cira Centre,” 38. 
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Philadelphia.50x  Altogether, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Community and Economic  
Development reports the KOZ program has produced 
over 16,000 jobs and induced over $3 billion of 
capital investment in Philadelphia in the past four 
years (See Table 4 in Appendix A).51  While this 
clearly is not as a result of the Cira Centre, it speaks 
to the success of the program on the whole.   
C. EFFECT ON LOCAL COMMUNITY 
 Combined with the efforts of the University 
City District, the Cira Centre has helped increase 
foot-traffic in the immediate area, and sparked initiatives for retail and residential 
development.  Using a blunt measurement, daily vehicular traffic in the 30th and Arch 
Street area jumped from 21,826 to over 35,000 in 2006.52  Additionally, mass transit 
ridership to 30th Street Station increased 6% between 2005 and 2006.53  After not having 
any new residential development between the years of 2002 and 2005, in 2006 and 2007 
University City saw the construction of five new residential buildings, with at least two 
more constructions in the pipeline over the next two years.  Despite being on the 
downside of the housing bubble, median residential sales prices in the area increased 22% 
($255,000 to $312,00) from 2005 to 2006, and 17.7% from 2006 to 2007, after having 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 18. 
x All figures back out the amount of impact that would have happened without the project, and thus reflect 
the incremental impact of the project. 
51 “Pennsylvania Keystone Opportunity Zone 4 Year Report.” Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
Economic Development, 2007, 6. 
52 Brennan, Lori Klein and Mark Christman. “University City Report Card.” University City District, 2007, 
21. 
53 Ibid., 26. 
Immediate Impact on 
Jobs in Philadelphia 
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increased on 4% the previous 
year (See University City 
Housing Market chart to the right 
and Q2 House Appreciation Rate 
by Neighborhood map below).54 
Employment has grown 10% 
since 2004, far outpacing the 
region’s 1% annual growth rate.  
6.3 million square feet of 
commercial space has recently 
been developed or is in the 
process of being developed.55 
Kevin Gillen reports that 
University City now has the second 
highest median housing prices in the city behind Center City.56   
The said goal of encouraging business development in the designated zone and 
extending Center City westward has been significantly furthered with the recent 
unveiling of the expansion plan put forth by the University of Pennsylvania and 
Brandywine Realty Trust.  “Penn Connects” is a multi-billion dollar redevelopment plan 
that aims to continue revitalization of the postal properties that surround the Cira Centre 
over the next thirty years.  The plan features the construction of numerous commercial, 
                                                 
54 Brennan, Lori Klein and Mark Christman, 23, and Kevin Gillen, “Philadelphia House Price Indices,” 
August 21, 2007, 24. 
55 Brennan, Lori Klein and Mark Christman, 12. 
56 Chris Mondics, “City Home Prices Off – Modestly,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 14, 2007, 
[http://www.philly.com/philly/business/11263141.html.] 
Source: University City District. 
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residential, and academic buildings over the predominately desolate 24-acre plot of land.  
Penn executive vice president Craig Carnaroli describes the ambitious goals of the 
project:  
This kind of development can begin to spur not only private 
investment, but public investment in quality infrastructure, bridge 
design, sidewalk design, and lighting.  I think the investment that Penn 
and Brandywine will be making will create the kind of elegant urban 
connective tissue that you’re looking for—that we see in Paris and 
Chicago and other cities, where bridge crossings are truly celebrated 
events in the urban landscape, and not just prosaic ways to get from 
one side to the other.57 
 
Improvements include two mixed-use Cira Centre South buildings designed by 
Brandywine, with an estimate cost of over $800 million (see picture below).58  The Cira 
Centre South will occupy 
14 acres of land, 
consisting of a 40- to 50-
story mixed-use office 
tower with hotel, 
condominium and retail 
components on Walnut 
Street accompanied by a 
25- to 30-story residential 
building on Chestnut Street.59  Penn has already agreed to lease 20% (100,000 square 
                                                 
57 “East Campus Rising,” The Pennsylvania Gazette, Vol. 124, No. 2, November/December 2007, 
[http://www.upenn.edu/gazette/1107/gaz01.html]. 
58 Saffron. 
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feet) of office space in the tower.60  Brandywine intends to have both towers completed 
by 2012.  Also included in the project will be the redevelopment of the post office on 30th 
and Market Streets into a regional headquarters for 5,000 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
employees and an adjacent 2,400-space car park.  The IRS has already inked a 20-year 
lease for the space beginning in 2010.  These developments over the next thirty years will 
certainly bring a great deal of economic stimulation to the area and have an enormous 
positive impact on the University City and Powelton Village communities, both socially 
and economically.61 
Brandywine’s role in the Penn Connects effort indicates a true interest in fulfilling 
the goal of connecting West Philadelphia and center city and lending the neighborhood a 
more integrated and urban environment.  Brandywine president and chief executive 
officer Jerry Sweeney has wanted to further integrate the community since the original 
Cira Centre’s construction: “It represents the culmination of many years of work of trying 
to create a commercial mixed-use facility within University City,” says Mr. Sweeney. “It 
validates the investment thesis for Cira Centre and provides a tremendous economic 
engine for West Philadelphia and University City.”62 Having spoken with Mr. Sweeney 
since the decision to continue with the project, Dr. Voith assures that “nothing gets built 
without KOIZ designation.” 63 
The University of Pennsylvania had been interested in developing this land since 
the 1980s, but until the KOIZ tax abatement they were unable to find a willing 
                                                                                                                                                 
59 Suzette Parmley, “New Towers to Rise on 30th St.,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 31, 2007, 
[http://www.philly.com/philly/news/homepage/20070831_New_towers_to_rise_on_30th_St_.html?text=xl
g]. 
60 “East Campus Rising.” 
61 “Penn Connects: A Vision for the Future.” University of Pennsylvania, June, 2006, 5. 
62 Parmley. 
63 Interview with Richard Voith. 
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development partner.  Penn offered Brandywine the opportunity to build the Cira Centre 
South with the proviso that the development is well integrated into the design of the rest 
of the neighborhood and conjures a lively, walkable neighborhood along the Schuylkill 
River.64  According to Penn president Amy Guttman, the project will create a row of 
impressive high-rise buildings figuratively shorten the gap of the Schuylkill: “It provides 
a much-needed connector between our campus and Center City, and improves the urban 
infrastructure of the university and creates a vital new center of commerce for the whole 
region.  It's converting a surface parking lot and eyesores into a mixed-use, greener, 24/7 
neighborhood that unites and enlivens both sides of the Schuylkill.”65 
As a testament to his commitment to the urbanity of the project, Mr. Sweeney has 
hired Sasaki Associates, a premier urban planning and design company, to create a list of 
changes to be made to the current Cira Centre that can better connect it to the community, 
as well as advise upon the new Cira Centre South development.  Sasaki proposes nearly 
$60 million in renovation and redevelopment of the existing Cira Centre, including the 
addition of a large plaza between 30th Street Station and the existing post office for 
improved walkabilty and community integration.66  Mr. Sweeney has worked closely 
with Sasaki and local city planners on the design of the Cira Centre South to ensure that 
the new development adheres to the principles of urbanity.  Among the most important 
features include a varied mix of uses and user, a great deal of involved street-level retail 
shops, and revamped sidewalks and streetscape for improved pedestrian maneuverability. 
                                                 
64 Inga Saffron,  “Changing Skyline | Filling a Philadelphia Real Estate Void: The $800 million Cira Centre 
South will be helpful, but not perfect,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 15, 2007, 
[http://www.philly.com/philly/news/homepage/10544462.html]. 
65 Parmley. 
66 Saffron. 
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According to Tony Dominick, one area in which the existing Cira Centre has 
lacked has been in its ability to connect with the surrounding community of Powelton 
Village.67  The most notable separation is physical: the property is virtually fenced off 
from the community to the west, and is bordered by a highway, a train station, parking 
lots, and empty land.  Despite its transit-oriented design, the building has a street-level 
disconnect.  The Cira Centre is tucked neatly behind 30th Street Station, and while 
vehicular traffic has increased considerably, there is little foot traffic on the streets 
surrounding it.  Even the employees who work in the building and use mass transit enter 
through a skywalk connected from 30th Street Station that runs above Arch Street.  
However, certain changes have made apparent the potential effect the development could 
have on its surroundings.  For example, since its construction, the retail and food court 
portion of 30th Street Station has been revamped, and the quality of the tenants has 
improved dramatically.  Perhaps the recommendations by Sasaki are implemented, the 
Cira Centre will be able to better flow with the neighborhood and encourage a more 
pedestrian-friendly environment. 
 
Artist rendering of the Cira Centre South. (Source: “Penn Connects: A Vision for the Future”) 
                                                 
67 Interview with Tony Dominick. 
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D. EFFECT ON CENTER CITY OFFICE MARKET 
 Many feared that the Cira Centre would negatively affect the Center City office 
market by flooding the market with excess space, then poaching tenants from existing 
Center City office buildings.  As Kevin Gillen explains, in order for the city to absorb 
over 700,000 square feet of new office space one of or a combination of three things must 
happen to maintain market equilibrium:68  
1. Capitalization rates69 must decline, meaning prices of office buildings must 
increase relative to rents. 
2. Demand, in this case office employment, must increase to accommodate the 
influx of new office space.  This means absorption70 must increase greatly. 
3. Existing space with vacating tenants must exit the market or be converted into 
a different use. 
Critics believed that, because of the suffering office market leading up to the Cira 
Centre’s development, the incursion of new office space would place the market in 
disequilibrium because there was an increase in supply without an increase in demand.  
This would result in either older office buildings being forced off the market as their 
tenants moved into the Cira Centre, or increased vacancy, which in turn would cause 
rents and eventually property values to fall dramatically.  The end result of either of these 
scenarios is lower tax revenue for the city, and thus, a failure of the KOIZ initiative.   
However, despite the Cira Centre poaching over 60% of their tenants from Center 
City, the Center City office market has not suffered any losses as a result of the Cira 
                                                 
68 Gillen, “The CBD Philadelphia Office Market Today and Tomorrow: The Impact of KOZs,” 9. 
69 Capitalization Rate = Rent or Net Operating Income/Price. A cap rate is a way to measure the speed at 
which an investment pays for itself through cash flows over a specified period of time. 
70 Absorption is the net amount of space leased over a given period of time. 
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Centre’s construction.  On the contrary, the city has enjoyed one of its most rapid office 
sector growths in recent history.  What occurred was a sharp spike in property values and 
a concordant cap rate compression.  Average price per square foot of office space in 
Center City increased from approximately $85 in the second quarter of 2004, to over 
$160 by the third quarter of 2006 (See Graph 2 in Appendix C).71  Nearly all of the 
vacancies created by the 
Cira Centre were back-let 
within six months, and 
Philadelphia’s Center City 
has not experienced a single 
quarter of negative 
absorption since the Cira 
Centre’s construction.72  In 
fact, during the quarter of 
the Cira Centre’s opening 
(Q4 2005), Center City 
absorbed over 1 million 
square feet of office space – 
the highest total of the 
millennium.73   
Additionally, office vacancies in Philadelphia have fallen from nearly 17% in Q2 
2005, to 13% in Q3 2007, while average rents have climbed from under $20 per square 
                                                 
71 “Estimated Economic and Fiscal Impact of the Cira Centre,” 30. 
72 Interview with John Gattuso. 
73 “State of Center City: 2007.” Center City District, 2007, 7. 
Source: Grubb & Ellis 
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foot to $25.09 in the same time period.74  Even more telling is the fact that Center City’s 
vacancy rate has dipped below 10% for the first time since 2001.75  The leasing activity 
and development in Center City continues to main strong through the end of 2007, even 
as the economy and national real estate market have slowed considerably.76  In fact, in a 
survey issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic 
Development, the number one concern sited by business executives entering the 
Philadelphia office market in 2006 was competition, whereas it was just the eighth 
greatest concern in 2003.77  Taxes, on the other hand, have decreased from the fifth 
greatest challenge to eighth greatest in the same time period.  The Cira Centre has had 
absolutely no negative effects on the Center City office market, mitigating fears that its 
short-term losses would dampen its unsure future returns. 
Source: Grubb & Ellis 
                                                 
74 “Office Market Trends Philadelphia: CBD & Suburbs – Third Quarter 2007,” Grubb & Ellis Company, 
2007, 1 and “Market View: Greater Philadelphia Office – Third Quarter 2007.” CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 
2007, 1. 
75 “Office Market Trends Philadelphia: CBD & Suburbs – Third Quarter 2007,” 1. 
76 “Studley Report,” Studley, 2007, 1. 
77 “Pennsylvania Business Retention & Expansion Program Report.” Pennsylvania Department of 
Community and Economic Development, 2007, 4. 
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Some may note that there have been several office-to-residential conversions in 
the last three years, most notably One Liberty Place, that have diluted the office market 
making it artificially buoyant.  Although this may be true, these office spaces went off the 
market naturally to reach equilibrium, and are now being utilized for their highest and 
best use to the benefit of the city.  The housing market was booming, and landlords saw 
an opportunity to take advantage of a hot market by converting their spaces.  At the same 
time, they were filling a void in the supply in residential sector, where demand was 
increasing more rapidly than in the office sector.   
It is also possible that there is a gap between the standard economic life of office 
buildings and technological developments in amenities.  Over the past two decades, there 
have been unbelievable advances in the technology sector that have fundamentally 
changed the way business is performed, and thus changed the requisites for a functional 
modern office space.  Historically, the normal economic life of a building is 39 years, 
however buildings constructed in the 1980s often do not have the amenities and 
infrastructure that modern businesses desire and need, especially if they are unrenovated.  
Therefore, it may be that the viable economic life for this generation of buildings is 
shorten than usual, indicating a need for new development and exiting of obsolete 
building models. 
Others may be concerned that tenants will vacate the property as soon as the 
abatements cease and the Cira Centre will add to the vacant space in the Philadelphia 
market.  Craig Zolot remarks that while initially Rubenstein Partners had intended to 
relocate back into Center City once the abatement terminated, he feels that the 
Rubenstein Partners, along with most other tenants, will now remain in building long-
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term.78  Mr. Zolot explains that the quality of the building, the transit-oriented location, 
and the proximity to downtown Philadelphia are the key attributes that will draw tenants 
to stay once the abatement expires.  Dr. Voith agrees with Mr. Zolot, and deems the 
argument that the Cira Centre will bleed tenants once the abatements end “silly.”79  He 
contends that while rents will undoubtedly decline to equilibrium after 2018, Brandywine 
has obviously anticipated this decline, and it is ludicrous to suggest that no one will 
occupy one of the luxurious office buildings in the city.  
John Gattuso believes that the Comcast Center and Cira Centre have had no 
negative effect on the Philadelphia office market because they are differentiated products 
that are not in direct competition with the rest of the office space on the market.80  
According to the compensating variation model of urban real estate, firm and individual 
location decisions are made based on the amenities provided them in relation to their 
cost.  It follows that companies would be willing to pay higher rent for superior 
amenities.  Similarly, individuals theoretically will be willing to pay higher rents and 
accept lower wages in exchange for better amenities.  The Comcast Center and Cira 
Centre are two class A-plus properties (especially when compared with the rest of the 
Philadelphia office stock) with technology and amenities that far exceed those of any 
other office property in the city.  Accordingly, their rents hover around $40 per square 
foot, while the Center City average rent for class A properties is just over $28 per square 
foot.  Firms will not relocate into these two buildings unless they believe the rent increase 
is justified by an analogous increase in amenity quality over the rest of the class A 
market.  New or growing firms that desire quality amenities and can afford the increased 
                                                 
78 Interview with Craig Zolot. 
79 Voith. 
80 Gattuso. 
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rent will locate in the better buildings, and the older buildings will continue to get tenants 
who care more about minimizing costs than building amenities.  Mr. Gattuso believes the 
two new additions to the skyline have helped create a “sense of positive momentum” for 
the Philadelphia economy.81   
The most legitimate argument discrediting the success of the Cira Centre is the 
strength of the national office and commercial real estate markets over the past several 
years.  Most notably, interest rate hit historic lows in 2006, causing cap rates to compress 
considerably nationwide based solely on the fact that money was cheaper.  Therefore, in 
many markets prices increased a great deal without any positive changes in the market’s 
fundamentals (ie. increased rents, lower vacancy).  However, even after the completion of 
the Cira Centre, the current anticipation of the Comcast Center, and the recent downturn 
in the national commercial real estate market, the Philadelphia office market continues to 
be buoyant, and Center City landlords are optimistic about the future of the market.  
George Cauffman, senior vice president of CB Richard Ellis notes, “The market has had a 
good two or three years to think about Comcast and move around it.  Almost every tenant 
out there wants big space…It’s trending towards a landlord market.”82 
Additionally, Philadelphia has outperformed the national average after lagging 
severely since 1994.  From 1994 to 2003, Philadelphia absorbed only 1.16 million square 
feet of office space total, for a paltry annual average of 116,000 square feet. By 
comparison, over the same duration Washington D.C., Boston, and New York absorbed 
13.5 million square feet, 9 million square feet, and 7 million square feet, respectively.83  
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Since the Cira Centre’s completion, Philadelphia hasn’t experienced annual absorption 
below 500,000 square feet, and has continued to experience positive net year-over-year 
absorption despite the national market’s recent downturn (32% decline nationally).84  
This indicates that Philadelphia’s buoyancy is not exclusively tied to the success of the 
national office market, marginalizing claims that the success has been artificially inflated.   
E. INTANGIBLES 
 The Cira Centre bring with it numerous vital intangible factors that indirectly add 
to the city’s overall appeal with respect to competing cities and the suburbs surrounding 
Philadelphia.  Perhaps most important has been the creation of a new class of luxurious, 
sustainable office stock never before seen in Philadelphia.85  The building serves as a 
new, visible form of infrastructure for the city.  Mr. Gattuso claims Philadelphia must 
modernize its office stock in order to grow the sector and the economy.86  Improved 
sustainability equates to more long-term relevance and less opportunity for obsolescence.  
Paul Morse, senior vice president of Office Leasing for Cushman & Wakefield in 
Toronto, believes building quality is immensely important in a firms location decision: 
“Buildings need ongoing attention and investment if they are going to remain competitive 
and retain the best tenants.  Tenants need offices that allow their employees to work at 
peek efficiency.  Modern communication systems, good air quality and high-tech security 
all play a big part in the office leasing market.  Even the most prestigious of addresses 
can start to slide down the scale if the owner doesn’t keep the building up-to-date.”87  The 
benefit of sustainable design is a widespread knowledge among leading companies, and it 
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is a highly attractive form of design, and imperative for Philadelphia to be competitive in 
future.   
Christopher Leinberger, a noted urban land strategist and developer, claims a vital 
aspect of revitalizing a stagnant urban center is the presence of a catalytic development or 
developer.88  He argues that often a city needs to entice one developer into being the first 
to develop a project that establishes demand above market risk and demonstrates to the 
rest of the development community that investment in that city does pay dividends 
economically.  The Cira Centre is a prime example of a catalytic development.  By being 
a large, visible, and financial successful development, the Cira Centre has stimulated a 
great deal of new investment in office real estate.  The most noted development is the 
Comcast Center, but there have been and are numerous other office developments and 
renovations in Center City influenced by the Cira Centre over the past several years (See 
Map 1 in Appendix B).  For example, currently World Acquisition Partners Corp. 
planning on investing between $115 and $140 million to add 30 to 48 stories to a 142,998 
square foot, 5-story office building at 2040 Market Street.89  According to Dr. Voith, “on 
the net, [office] building were substandard,” but landlords “don’t want to spend if they 
don’t have to” so for over a decade basically no improvements were made to the office 
stock.  However, once the Cira Centre entered the market, landlords were forced to start 
improving their properties in order to compete with the newer, more efficient product.90  
This upgrading has been a large reason for the rent increase over the past several years.  
Those landlords unwilling to adjust to the new standards will either be forced to exit or, 
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like many already have, convert to a higher and better use.  Either way, the city is 
benefiting from a more efficient use of space and improved infrastructure. 
Another important intangible aspect of the Cira Centre is its aesthetically 
pleasing, highly visible, and transit-oriented design.91  Not only does this promote the 
principles of urbanity, but also it better utilizes the city’s well-developed transit 
infrastructure and reduces costs associated with vehicular transportation like deterioration 
of roads.  It also provides for public cost savings, greater mobility, environmental 
stewardship, and reduced congestion.92  According to Dr. Voith, an urban transportation 
guru, the Cira Centre is a wonderful example of an urban, transit-oriented development; it 
is a high-density area that serves as a nexus for jobs, retail, and transportation.93  The Cira 
Centre’s location next to 30th Street Station also lends it phenomenal visibility to 
businesspeople traveling along the Northeastern Corridor, most notably to and from 
Washington D.C., Boston, and New York City.94  Mr. Zolot believes that unique design 
of the Cira Centre makes a profound physical statement both for University City and 
Philadelphia on the whole.95  The Cira Centre is an immensely beautiful and alluring 
structure, evidenced by its 2006 American Architecture Award.96  According to Keith 
Davey, signature buildings are one of the most important aspects of a city’s image;  the 
Cira Centre has certainly redefined the Philadelphia skyline.97 
Consequently, Philadelphia has seen an increase in office occupancy and demand 
because it is once again being recognized as desirable, growing center of business.  
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Although slight, office sector jobs grew for the first time since 2001 (See Chart 1 in 
Appendix B).  Prior to the Cira Centre’s construction, no businesses wanted to remain in 
or relocate to Philadelphia because all of the “Class A” office stock was at least fifteen to 
twenty-five years old.  There was no impetus for a company to move into Philadelphia 
because it was viewed as a city declining not only in population, but also in vitality and 
competitive appeal.98  The Cira Centre helped strengthen the declining state of the city to 
become one of the premier urban office locations in the entire Mid-Atlantic region by 
providing an advanced product seldom found in inner cities demanded by firms.99  By 
acting as a catalyst for new development and renovation, the Cira Centre has allowed 
Philadelphia to offer an improved, more sustainable infrastructure, which leads to an 
ability to attract a new brand and better quality of tenants into its office space.100  
This visibility and facilitation of urban principles is an important attraction not 
only for those commuting through the city, but also for the young knowledge workers 
that have been responsible for the “brain drain” in Philadelphia.  By creating an urban-
friendly, dense, alluring, transit-oriented building, the Cira Centre facilitates the 
technologically advanced, innovative urban landscape so attractive to entry-level 
knowledge workers.  In 2006, a survey of recent college graduates aged 25 to 34 reported 
that 71% of those surveyed said that a walkable environment with unique architecture 
was of most importance when choosing a living location.101  Another study of 1,000 
young professionals conducted by Yankelovich Survey for CEOs for Cities in March 
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2006 revealed that 67% of college graduates between the ages of 25 and 34 choose a 
“great place” before a specific job, implying that a city’s image is of utmost 
significance.102  Philadelphia, therefore, now has a unique opportunity to take advantage 
of the improvements made to its landscape to bolster its image in the media and attract 
young businesspeople. 
From a purely economic standpoint, it has been proven that it often does not make 
fiscal sense to offer extensive economic incentives to attract business.  In many regards, 
Philadelphia may have been lucky that there was sustained economic growth nationally 
that negated the possible losses stemming from the Cira Centre’s construction.  However, 
the symbolic importance of revitalization within the city is an immeasurable positive 
externality of the Cira Centre.  All of the aforementioned developments help 
Philadelphia’s image as a desirable destination location that can compete with other 
major cities in the Northeast Corridor.  As yet, it is unclear as to whether Philadelphia’s 
office market will continue to grow strongly now that real estate has cooled off, but it is 
encouraging that there is now positive population growth and a renewed sense of 
innovation within the city.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
My research suggests that the implementation of Keystone Opportunity Zone tax 
benefits to aid the construction of the Cira Centre has proven to have a positive social and 
economic impact on the city and the surrounding community.  There has been a great 
deal of controversy surrounding the effectiveness of using tax incentives to attract 
business and foster development surrounding Center City.  Those in opposition argue that 
the Cira Centre’s poaching of tenants from Center City will only hurt the city’s office 
market while reducing its overall tax base, negatively affecting existing owners in Center 
City and taxing authorities like the School District of Philadelphia, and the Center City 
District.  Those supporting the tax incentives believe that long-term economic stimulus 
and tax revenues will outweigh any short-term externalities produced by the temporary 
tax exemption.   
Historical and current statistical data demonstrate that Philadelphia’s tax base and 
Center City office market have not experienced any significant weakening in the wake of 
the Cira Centre’s construction.  Although there is currently a physical divide between the 
Cira Centre and University City, pipeline development plans seem to indicate that the 
goal of local stimulation is beginning to be fulfilled.  Perhaps most important, the Cira 
Centre has seemed to have caused a tipping point for the Philadelphia office market.  
Since its development, there has been a strong trend towards high-end, sustainable 
development and renovation, which has renewed demand for office space throughout the 
city.  This shift was a necessary change for Philadelphia to continue to be competitive in 
vying for business moving forward. 
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To what extent did the KOIZ and the Cira Centre directly affect the 
aforementioned economic and social indicators? What enabled the program to succeed in 
this particular setting?  To answer these questions I will first examine what characteristics 
of the KOIZ program seem to be most effective.  Then I will examine the scenario in 
which the Cira Centre succeeded, and suggest situations in which KOIZs or similar 
incentives would be thrive.  Finally, I will recommend policy changes for both the KOIZ 
program and the city of Philadelphia.    
A. POSITIVE KOIZ POLICY CHARACTERISTICS  
The Keystone Opportunity Investment Zone program exhibits many of the 
positive qualities most urban researchers deem most important when evaluating economic 
incentive plans.  One of the most important aspects of the KOIZ program is its 
discretionary nature.  Instead of providing direct assistance to firms on a first-come, first-
serve basis, the KOIZ program is highly selective in awarding benefits to firms.  This 
helps prevent inefficient allocation of government resources by allocating tax dollars to 
firms with little expected revenue or job growth.103  In turn, quality tenants and 
developers are chosen to locate within the zones, increasing the potential for lucrative tax 
returns and substantial impact on the city’s business environment. 
The guidelines of the program (enumerated in Section V.A) allow for strong 
control over eligible candidates.  There is significant interaction with prospective 
developers over the goals of a project and the viability of its design.  For example, Jerry 
Sweeney’s vision for the Cira Centre was reviewed thoroughly before being granted 
KOIZ status.  It was Mr. Sweeney’s intention throughout to expand the Cira Centre to try 
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to develop the West Philadelphia neighborhood into a vivacious commercial center.104  
Also, Mr. Sweeney was required to go through great lengths to attract companies from 
outside the Philadelphia area before accepting tenants from Center City.105  This kind of 
control over potential projects is necessary for effective execution of any zoned incentive 
program. 
Forcing firms relocating into the zone from within Pennsylvania to increase their 
employment by 20% or invest 10% of profits into the site guarantees at least some 
economic stimulation in return for tax abatements.  Peters and Fischer assert that local 
job growth is the sign of a good incentive plan, and it is likely that if a firm must expand 
by 20%, a fair portion of those new jobs will be from within the urban realm.  Another 
significant covenant is that tenants must stay for at least five before vacating in order to 
reap the benefits of the tax abatements.  This provision acts as a type of inexplicit 
clawback clause for the city and state.106  Insurances such as these are important, and can 
save the city a great deal of money. 
By virtue of how KOIZs are designed, there is extensive communication with the 
local community to determine how the project will progress.107  The governor proposes 
an area for designation, and the local community has to approve the status.  Plans for 
growth are established cooperatively among the state, city, and community so that the 
needs of the neighborhood are held in account.  According to Tony Dominick, the local 
community does have an important hand in deciding the projects that are undertaken and 
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how they are executed.108 For example, it is the local coordinator who reviews KOIZ 
applications and assigns approval.109  Together, the groups can identify any market 
failures in the area that may prevent efficient use of resources and address them 
collaboratively.   
Another important feature of the Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zone 
program is that it offers immediate and meaningful rewards to incoming companies.  
According to Alan Peters and Peter Fischer, capital incentives are more successful than 
credits that reduce the price of labor because companies on the margin are unable to 
redeem all of the credits.110  It is important for the benefits to be upfront because 
corporations’ location analysis is extremely short-termed.  Long-term incentives will 
often prevent sites from attaining premier firms.111  The variety of tax incentives offered 
through the KOIZ program provide immediate and substantial savings for relocating 
firms.  This allows the area to attract top-tier companies and create maximal economic 
stimulation.  Kevin Gillen describes the potential success of the Cira Centre South 
project, emphasizing the draw of the KOIZ tax incentives: “With the benefits of KOIZ 
designation, even in a slumping market the project still works, because it confers massive 
tax benefits. They’ll have no problem leasing it out, just like Cira had no problem leasing 
[their space] out for prime rent.”112 
Finally, the state of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia have done a good 
job of publicizing and marketing the program so that executives are aware of the benefits 
available to them.  It is important not to underestimate the importance of marketing and 
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facilitation of a positive image.  Incentives can be helpful, but they are obsolete if 
executives and developers are unaware of them.  Pennsylvania’s Business Retention and 
Expansion Program has widely advertised its variety of incentive programs through 
websites, surveys, and print advertisements.  The Select Greater Philadelphia marketing 
program has also reached many businesses and help provide momentum to the 
Philadelphia commercial real estate market.113   
B. SCENERIOS FOR SUCCESS 
 The timing of the Cira Centre’s deliverance was somewhat fortuitous because it 
coincided with several positive changes in the political and economic environment, both 
nationally and locally.  Nationally, the interest rates dropped to historic lows so that the 
cost of money was very cheap.  Commercial real estate markets across the country were 
very successful.  Properties in many markets appreciated simply off of cap rate 
compression.  Locally, at the beginning of 2005 Pennsylvania unveiled its Business Tax 
Reform that planned to reduced the corporate net income tax.  Governor Ed Rendell 
ramped up the Business Retention and Expansion Program, and introduced a series of 
incentives across the state.  The city of Philadelphia has been abating all real estate 
property taxes on commercial developments and renovations.  This program has been 
especially successful in  tandem with the KOIZ initiative.  According to a study done by 
Econsult in 2006, since the program was expanded in 2000, it has generated an estimated 
67% of the residential development in that time period.114  Appreciation of residential 
housing has increased 20% annually over the past several years, after appreciating just 
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2% annually between1990 and 1999.115  This indicates that the KOIZ program has 
certainly benefited from a positive economic situation both locally and nationally.  While 
these positive circumstances can help mitigate the potential negative effects of the KOIZ 
program, it appears as though the incentive still would have been successful in a less 
favorable period, only to a lesser extent.  Perhaps more importantly, it also shows that the 
initiative thrives when complemented by other similar incentive programs. 
Research has shown that a major reason for firms’ flight from inner city locations 
is the lack of land or infrastructure for expansion.116  Cities still possess important 
competitive advantages to suburbs, but lack of blocks of space and exorbitant costs often 
diminish these benefits and inflict a drain on local tax revenue.  Hence, the creation of a 
new viable and attractive business site like the Cira Centre in Philadelphia improves the 
city’s chances of retaining and attracting the largest and most desirable firms.  The KOIZ 
provision that mandates 20% employment growth for firms relocating within the state to 
move into the zone ensures that these spaces are not filled by marginal firms, but rather 
firms that truly are growing and need space to expand.  According to the most recent 
Studley Report, the number of contiguous spaces of over 50,000 square feet have decline 
from has decline from twenty in the beginning of 2005, to just eleven in the third quarter 
of 2007.117  While this indicates an appetite for office space in Philadelphia, it also shows 
that even in a time of increasing development, the city can use the space available in 
West Philadelphia to accommodate growth and the necessity for large tracts of land.  The 
Cira Centre takes advantage of an un-fragmented ready-to-use portion land in the city 
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that combines the space for growth and expansion with the positive externalities of an 
urban locale.   
The Comcast Center, which is 87% leased to the Comcast Corporation (which 
translates into over 1 million square feet of office space), is another perfect example of a 
necessary expansion of space to accommodate a growing regional company.118  Although 
the city and state were forced to give nearly $30 million in aid to the developer, one of 
the fastest-growing companies in the Mid-Atlantic, the Comcast Corporation, would have 
left Philadelphia – most likely for a spacious suburban office park – had it not received a 
new, contiguous office space of adequate size.     
An important difference between the Cira Centre and other zone incentive 
developments in Pennsylvania is its proximity to a legitimate central business district.  
Tax zones frequently are unsuccessful because they are unable to compensate for the 
competitive disadvantages that exist in am undeveloped or rural area, like cost of 
transporting goods, commuting costs, access to airports, infrastructure, and building 
functionality.119  The Cira Centre, on the other had, is located within the fifth largest city 
in the country, and two minutes from the heart of the central business district.  For this 
reason the infrastructure is already fully developed and functional, and the building itself 
has no shortcomings, aesthetically or functionally.  This would suggest that the KOIZ 
program, and zoned programs in general, seems most effective in either reviving 
potentially dormant cities with solid infrastructure, or spurring on development in a less 
economically development neighborhoods of successful cities.  For example, a similar 
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program in the outer boroughs of Manhattan may be able to stimulate commercial 
development for businesses that wish to reap the benefits of urbanity but cannot afford 
Manhattan rents.  In either capacity, zoned projects tend to have greater success in or on 
the fringes of a large city because their projects can continue to prosper once the 
abatements end.  It is extremely important, though, that site is a quality structure so that 
tenants will want to remain there once the tax abatement is terminated.  Otherwise, 
tenants will vacate once abatement expires because there are sites in better locations.  
Like Mr. Zolot remarked, Rubenstein Partners were originally planning on vacation the 
Cira Centre upon completion of the abatement, but after experiencing the superior 
amenities it offers, the company has decided to remain past the abatement deadline.120  
These incentives are different from those offered in primate cities like New York 
and Chicago, because many of the businesses receiving tax benefits there most likely 
would have located in those cities regardless.  Philadelphia, however, had been bleeding 
businesses and losing out to cities like New York, Washington D.C., and Boston.121  
Through the early 2000s, many businesses had sited Philadelphia’s burdensome tax 
structure as one of its leading disincentives.  Additionally, it is not considered a world-
class or top-tier city, and therefore is not on the forefront of executives’ minds when 
choosing a relocation destination.  While the aforementioned cities are largely 
competitive without incentives, Philadelphia truly needs them to be competitive, in part 
due to its reputation. The incentives are, in the words of Bartik, “decisive” in businesses’ 
decision to relocate to or remain in Philadelphia.122 
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It has been proven that zoned incentive programs are most effective at attracting 
businesses intra-regionally because spatially variable factors like labor and transportation 
costs are only slightly different.123  Therefore, the KOIZ in Philadelphia should play a 
large role in reversing the recent trend of businesses’ flight from inner city Philadelphia 
into the suburbs.  Over the past two decades, Philadelphia has been losing jobs to the 
suburbs at an alarming rate.  Although the negative trend of office sector employment 
turned slightly positive in 2006, Philadelphia continues to lose its share of the regional 
employment pool.124  According to a report published by the Central Philadelphia 
Development Corporation, between 1990 and 2005 Center City’s share of regional office 
employment plummeted from 47% to 32%.125  Likewise, the lack of downtown and 
commercial office development in the 1990s Center City’s share of the region’s office 
inventory dropped from 41% in 1993 to just 28% in 2004, six points below the national 
Central Business District average.126  The flight of jobs also contributed to the housing 
slump because individuals followed the jobs to the suburbs.  The success of Cira Centre’s 
development demonstrates that businesses do in fact value a proximity to the business 
center, universities, and well-designed transit hubs as long as the costs are not 
exorbitant.127 
In sum, there are a few different circumstances under which the KOIZ program 
and other programs of its ilk will thrive.  First, the program is perfect for acting as a 
catalyst to revitalize a slumping commercial real estate market in a city with solid 
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business infrastructure.  Certainly the program must exhibit the qualities enumerated 
earlier in the section in order to ensure that the right businesses are entering the market.  
The project must be a viable, sustainable building that will still have long-term value 
once the abatements have terminated or else it will become vacant upon expiration.  It is 
evident though, that one successful landmark development can help persuade developers 
who were afraid of entering the market because of recent stagnation.  This program can 
also serve a similar purpose of laying the groundwork for future commercial development 
of a stagnant neighborhood of a large city.  While the Cira Centre acted in both of these 
capacities, each of these scenarios can be successful individually.  Zoned incentives do 
not thrive, however, in economically undeveloped or rural areas because the incentive is 
rarely enough to overcome the disadvantages associated with locating in an inferior area.  
If the incentives are enough to lure permanent tenants, then they are probably to high for 
the municipality to realize gains from. 
The KOIZ program also seems fit to help cities losing business to suburban sites 
lure expanding businesses to stay in or return to urban areas.  Zoned programs are most 
effective in intra-regional setting because incentives play a more decisive role in firms’ 
location decision.  If the zones can take advantage of inefficiencies causing market 
failures in underdeveloped urban neighborhoods, they can provide large, contiguous 
spaces at reduced prices for expanding firms who wish to continue to take advantage of 
the positive externalities associated with urban economies and infrastructure.  The 
program seems especially effective when used in tandem with other incentives that 
encourage growth in other aspects of commercial real estate.  In fact, programs of this 
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sort even seem necessary in second-tier cities that do not have the technologically 
advanced stock and renowned reputation to prevent urban flight. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to maximize the value of the tax incentive, it is extremely important that 
the policy is decisive in businesses’ and developers’ choice to locate within the zone.128  
In order to help ensure that the incentive is in fact decisive, the city can require 
businesses to legally certify, with official financial figures, that without the KOIZ tax 
incentive they would have decided to locate elsewhere.  It is also helpful to hire a private 
economic consultant to generate models and projections that will provide estimates of the 
fiscal and labor market gains associated with attracting a particular new company. 129 
This way, incentives can be even more personalized to each specific project or 
prospective participant.  For example, Bartik claims incentives should be larger for 
developments that hire and employ local residents, especially if the residents are 
unemployed.130  The KOIZ program also needs to do a better job of connecting with the 
local community and enforcing the parameters set forth in its guidelines concerning local 
stimulation.  As Tony Dominick stated, since the initial phases, there has been little 
interaction between Brandywine and the Powelton Village area.  The development has 
had little clear and direct influence on the Powelton Village neighborhood, and is 
physically independent of its surroundings.131  Clearly, the “Penn Connects” project is an 
attempt to better integrate the community, however the original Cira Centre has seemed 
to have failed somewhat on the local social development front. 
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It is important that the city reinvest the tax revenue generated from incentive 
programs to improve the business environment and make it a more attractive place for 
businesses to locate and remain.  Studies by the Initiative for a Competitive Inner City 
reveal that while tax rates are of utmost importance in the decision-making process for 
relocating businesses, existing businesses complain most about allocation of tax 
revenue.132  Tax and regulatory policy should not restrict business growth and must be 
competitive with other municipalities in the region.  The Philadelphia policymakers must 
be responsive to the concerns and needs of local businesses so that the city can adapt to 
accommodate varying business environments.  An important way to increase efficiency is 
to maintain a well-funded public transportation system, and encourage transit-oriented 
development.133  By providing a healthy urban environment with an advanced stock of 
office space, the city will be able to attract both young knowledge professionals and top-
tier businesses.  Ultimately, reinvestment in the form of infrastructure should pay for 
itself in attraction of businesses, reducing the necessity of economic incentives.   
Crime is another important area of improvement for Philadelphia.  According to 
Dr. Voith, it is nearly impossible to attract business and experience sustained economic 
growth and prosperity with a high rate of crime.   Economic development will not truly 
be able to thrive unless businesses see opportunities that prevail over the costs and risks 
associated with locating in inner cities.134  Included in these risk assessments is access to 
a high-quality labor pool, which is diminished if the city is perceived to be dangerous.  In 
October 2006, the Philadelphia Center City District conducted a survey of recent college 
graduates, which showed that safety and housing costs were afforded the most 
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importance when deciding upon a place to live.135  If Philadelphia is unable establish a 
satisfactory labor pool, no matter how effective its economic incentives are it will not be 
able to attract businesses. 
The city’s economic development plan should try to transform the public’s 
perception of crime and economic opportunities in Philadelphia.  The battle against crime 
needs to be waged on two fronts.  Obviously an absolute citywide reduction in crime is 
essential.  The recent economic boom Philadelphia has experienced should have 
produced some extra tax revenue that could be invested in crime prevention.  However, it 
is equally important that the city produces targeted advertisements publicizing any 
improvements in crime in and around the city.  Interviews with business executives 
reveal “perception of high crime rates is a greater competitive disadvantage for inner city 
businesses than actual crime.”136  Perceptions perpetuated by the media can destroy a 
city’s reputation, even if its actual crime and business climate statistics are not as bad as 
portrayed.  The mayor’s office can be used as a platform to bring attention to the city’s 
friendly streets and burgeoning economic opportunities. 
While the KOIZ tax incentive along with the real estate property tax abatement in 
Philadelphia have certainly acted as catalysts for urban rejuvenation, ultimately the city 
needs either to continue to lower its business privilege taxes or allocate tax revenues 
more efficiently in order to compete regionally.  According to Peters and Fischer, 
research has shown that the areas that present the highest returns with incentive zones are 
also the areas with the highest return without them.137  In other words, it is the underlying 
tax structure and system that fosters long-term, sustained economic growth.  In order for 
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Philadelphia to reverse the trend of firms moving to the suburbs, it will have to continue 
to develop a more competitive tax structure.138  The Keystone Opportunity Improvement 
Zone program with respect to the Cira Centre has been particularly successful in 
Philadelphia because it changed the direction of the business and development trends in 
the city; much of its success has been intangible.   
Both the state of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia have been taking the right steps 
towards improving their tax structures.  The Tax Foundation in Washington, D.C., shows 
that Pennsylvania’s tax climate is one of the best and most business friendly among mid-
Atlantic and New England states.  In 2006, Pennsylvania ranked sixteenth overall among 
50 states for tax environment, improved from twentieth in 2004.139  The municipal 
government must continue to prove that the new firms made the correct decision in 
relocating and remaining in Philadelphia or the momentum derived from these new 
developments will dwindle and the city will once again be faced with economic 
stagnation.  Dr. Voith advocates lower taxes across the board, directly reinforcing the 
Tiebout principle that residents and firms will vote with their feet: “You can’t overtax at 
the local level because people will leave.”140   
If Philadelphia can continue to improve the competitiveness of its tax system 
while maintaining above-standard transit- and business-related infrastructure, the office 
sector should continue growing at a moderate pace over the next several years.  
Eventually, as the city regains its status as a destination location, it maybe able to begin 
reducing certain tax incentives or phasing them out completely.  The Cira Centre has 
                                                 
138 “State of Center City 2007,” 24. 
139 “Pennsylvania Business Retention & Expansion Program Report,” 10. 
140 Voith. 
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provided a valuable lesson that, when executed properly, zoned incentives can play 
important roles in facilitating growth and stimulation in the correct context. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: 
Table 1 : Worst Case Scenario Returns from Cira Centre Construction with KOIZ 
 
 
 
Table 2: Cira Centre Rent Roll – Initial lease up 
Tenant 
Space 
Occupied (sq. 
ft.) 
Previous Location 
Dechert 245,000 Center City 
Woodcock Washburn 109,000 Center City 
SCA North America 101,000 Eddystone, PA 
Lubert Adler 58,000 Center City 
Brandywine Asset Management 54,755 Wilmington, DE 
McKinsey & Co 27,600 New York, NY 
Reger Rizzo Kavulich & Darnall 27,600 King of Prussia, PA 
Attalus Capital 20,000 Bala Cynwyd, PA 
Mand Marblestone Danziger 9,500 Bala Cynwyd, PA 
Blackrock Financial Management 8,500 Wilmington, DE 
Capsicum Group 1,800 Berwyn, PA 
Total 662,755 Percentage 
From: Center City 412,000 62.2% 
From: Pennsylvania 571,900 86.3% 
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Current Rental Rate, Cira Centre $45.00/sf   
Current Average Class A Rental Rate, Center City $28.27/sf   
 
Table 3: Fiscal Impact of Cira Centre on Philadelphia 
 
 
Table 4: KOZ Economic Stimulation 
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APPENDIX B 
Map 1: Center City Development Map 
 
 
Graph 1: Office Employment 
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APPENDIX C 
Graph 2: Price per square foot of Office Space in Philadelphia 
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